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Twin-field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) is highly attractive because it can beat the fundamental limit
of secret key rate for point-to-point QKD without quantum repeaters. Many theoretical and experimental studies
have shown the superiority of TFQKD in long-distance communication. All previous experimental implemen-
tations of TFQKD have been done over optical channels with symmetric losses. But in reality, especially in
a network setting, the distances between users and the middle node could be very different. In this paper, we
perform a first proof-of-principle experimental demonstration of TFQKD over optical channels with asymmet-
ric losses. We compare two compensation strategies, that are (1) applying asymmetric signal intensities and (2)
adding extra losses, and verify that strategy (1) provides much better key rate. Moreover, the higher the loss, the
more key rate enhancement it can achieve. By applying asymmetric signal intensities, TFQKD with asymmetric
channel losses not only surpasses the fundamental limit of key rate of point-to-point QKD for 50 dB overall
loss, but also has key rate as high as 2.918 × 10−6 for 56 dB overall loss. Whereas no keys are obtained with
strategy (2) for 56 dB loss. The increased key rate and enlarged distance coverage of TFQKD with asymmetric
channel losses guarantee its superiority in long-distance quantum networks.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables remote users to share secret keys with information-theoretic security [1, 2]. How-
ever, due to the unavoidable losses of optical channels, there exists a fundamental limit on the achievable secret key rate of long
distance QKD. Without using quantum repeaters, the upper bound (also called repeaterless bound in this paper) of the secret
key rate of QKD scales linearly with the channel transmittance η [3, 4]. Remarkably, a new type of QKD, called twin-field (TF)
QKD, has been proposed [5] and can practically overcome the repeaterless bound. In TFQKD, like in the measurement-device-
independent (MDI) QKD [6], two users (Alice and Bob) send two coherent states to an un-trusted intermediate node, i.e. Charlie,
who performs the measurement. Because TFQKD employs single photon interference, rather than two-photon interference in
MDIQKD, the secret key rate of TFQKD scales as
√
η, allowing for unprecedented distance coverage. Plenty of variations
and security analysis of TFQKD [7–12] have been studied, followed by multiple experimental demonstrations [13–16]. More
recently, TFQKD has been successfully implemented over more than 500 km fibers [17, 18]. It has been shown that TFQKD is
one of the most promising and practical solutions to long distance QKD.
However, all the above mentioned studies only consider TFQKD over optical channels with symmetric losses between each of
the users and intermediate node, and let Alice and Bob use identical sets of operations in preparing their signals. However, this
assumption on channel symmetry is seldom true in reality. TFQKD over asymmetric channels is important not only for practical
point-to-point implementations, but also in a network setting in where the optical distances between users and the middle node
can be significantly different. For instance, as shown in Fig.(1), if we consider a Sagnac-loop setup, multiple users can be placed
on the same loop, where they share a common relay, to implement a TFQKD network. However, the users on the loop naturally
will have different distances to the relay, thus making asymmetric channels a major characteristic for such a TFQKD network
setup. Similar problems also exist for star-shaped networks where users are placed arbitrary distances away from a central relay.
Unfortunately, because TFQKD depends on a good visibility of single-photon interference, it requires the two channels to
have similar levels of loss. This means that current implementations of TFQKD will have suboptimal or even zero key rate if
channels are asymmetric. One intuitive solution is to deliberately add fibers/losses to compensate for the shorter distance [19].
But this solution is not the optimal strategy, because it would increase signal loss and thus lower the secret key rate.
Instead of physically adding fibres/losses, several recent theoretical papers [20–23] in TFQKD study the use of asymmetric
intensities between Alice and Bob to compensate for channel asymmetry and obtain optical secret key rate1. Ref.[20, 23] are
based on an asymmetric-intensity version of the ”Sending-or-not-Sending (SNS)” Protocol [9], while Refs.[21, 22] are based on
the protocol proposed in [11] by Curty, Azuma, Lo (for simplicity, let us call the protocol ”CAL19” protocol here).
In this paper we have implemented the protocol in Ref.[22]2. The key point of the protocol is that Alice and Bob can adjust
1 The limitation to symmetric optical channels has been first observed and investigated for MDIQKD, whose visibility also requires symmetry between optical
channels. Refs.[24, 25] proposed a method to compensate for channel asymmetry in MDIQKD with asymmetric laser intensities, which is experimentally
verified in Ref.[26].
2 We choose Ref. [22] over the other three references, as the CAL19 protocol provides higher key rate than SNS protocol except over extremely long distances.
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2their signal intensities independently, to effectively compensate for channel asymmetry. In this work, we for the first time
experimentally demonstrate TFQKD over optical channels with asymmetric losses, and show that the new protocol provides
much higher key rate and longer distance than previous strategies (adding extra loss or using no compensation at all). Importantly,
this also shows the feasibility of a TFQKD based quantum network.
The key steps of the asymmetric-intensity TFQKD protocol[22] demonstrated in this paper are summarized as follows. Alice
and Bob prepare weak coherent states and randomly choose X and Z bases. For signal states in X basis, Alice and Bob randomly
add a 0 or pi phase and set the intensities of states to sA and sB respectively. For decoy states in Z basis, a random phase is added
and the intensities are randomly chosen from {µ, ν, ω}. The important difference from the CAL19 protocol in Ref.[11, 14] is
that, signal intensities sA and sB can be set to different values, while the intensities of Alice’s and Bob’s decoy states are still kept
symmetric. Such a choice of intensities is because, as explained in Ref.[22], the X basis requires intensities arriving at Charles to
be symmetric for a good interference visibility (hence sA, sB should be different, to compensate for channel asymmetry), while
the Z basis doesn’t have such a requirement (hence decoy states can simply be set to symmetric to simplify implementation).
The latter is because the estimation of phase error rate is based on photon-number yields in the Z basis, which is little affected
by asymmetry of intensities arriving at Charles. Then Alice and Bob send their states to the middle node Charlie, who measures
the interference of the coming states and announces the results.
The experimental setup used in our previous work of TFQKD over symmetric optical channels in Ref.[14] can be simply
adopted to implement the asymmetric-intensity TFQKD protocol, as shown in Fig.(2). As a proof-of-principle demonstration,
we only use the optical variable attenuators (VOAA and VOAB) to simulate the optical channel losses between Alice/Bob
and Charlie. The only difference from the setup in Ref.[14] is that VOAA and VOAB have different attenuation to mimic the
asymmetric channel losses. As indicated in Ref.[14], a two-way QKD system consisting of a Sagnac interferometer is applied to
overcome the main challenge of implementing TFQKD, namely, the phase stabilization. The common-path nature of the Sagnac
loop automatically compensates for phase fluctuations, thus maintaining long-term phase stability between the weak coherent
states sent from Alice and Bob. Moreover, the laser located on Charlie’s station is shared by Alice and Bob, to guarantee
the matched global phase. Filters, attenuators and monitoring detectors can be added on Alice’s and Bob’s stations to prevent
possible attacks from eavesdropper. More discussion about the security of the setup can be found in Ref.[14].
FIG. 1: Illustration of a Sagnac-loop-based TFQKD network. Multiple users can be placed on the same loop to communicate via a single
relay. As can be seen here, arbitrary pairs of users can have very different distances (channel losses) from the relay, which necessitate a
TFQKD protocol that maintains good performance even in the presence of channel asymmetry. In this work we present the experimental
implementation of an asymmetric-intensity TFQKD protocol that maintains high rate through asymmetric channels, thus demonstrating the
feasibility of such a Sagnac-loop-based TFQKD network.
Also, while Ref.[21, 22] are both based on the CAL19 protocol, Ref.[22] provides the additional convenience of only requiring signal states (and not decoy
states) to be asymmetric.
3Charlie uses his intensity modulator (IMC) and VOAC to create weak coherent pulses (10MHz, 900 ps) from a continuous
wave source and sends the pulses to Alice and Bob. The pulses go through an optical circulator and enter the Sagnac loop
through a 50:50 beam splitter (BS), where the pulses splits into clockwise traveling and counter-clockwise traveling pluses.
Clockwise (counter-clockwise) pluses first go through VOAA (VOAB) and Alices (Bob’s) station without being modulated.
Then the clockwise (counter-clockwise) pulses pass a 7-km fiber spool (with loss of about 7 dB) before reaching Bob’s (Alice’s)
station. Note that no information is transmitted over the channel Between Alice and Bob. On Bob’s (Alice’s) station, the pulses
are modulated by a phase modulator PMB (PMA) and an intensity modulator IMB (IMA). Based on different bases Alice and
Bob choose, the phases and intensities of the pulses are modulated accordingly. All the modulators in the set-up are driven
and synchronized by a high speed arbitrary waveform generator (AWG, Keysight M8195). The modulated pulses from Alice
and Bob travel through the attenuators VOAB and VOAA and interfere at Charlie’s BS. One output of the BS is directed to a
single-photon detector (SPD) D0 via the circulator, and the other output is followed directly by another SPD, D1. Charlie then
uses D0 and D1 to record the interference and publicly announces the results. The SPDs used in the set-up are the commercial
free-run avalanche photodiodes (ID220)), the dark count probability of which is about 7× 10−7.
It is very important to ensure that Alice and Bob only modulate the pulses traveling in designed directions. That is to say, the
clockwise and counter-clockwise traveling pulses should never overlap with each other at any of Alice’s and Bob’s modulators.
Therefore, the fiber lengths among the users and middle node are carefully calibrated to avoid the overlap of the arriving time at
any modulators between the clockwise and counter-clockwise traveling pulses. Another challenge in experiment is that the lim-
ited extinction ratio of a single intensity modulator is not sufficient to generate the vacuum state (ω), especially on Alice’s station
where the power of the injected pulse (that should be modulated) is always 10 dB higher than that on Bob’s station. To create
the vacuum state, we use two intensity modulators to achieve more than 65dB extinction ratio. The resulting pulse is suppressed
below the dark count noise of the detectors. Multiple polarization controllers are used for the initial polarization alignment but
no active polarization control is needed. Because of the auto compensation of phase fluctuation of Sagnac interferometer, our
system is stable and the interference visibility is kept as high as 99.8%. In this paper, the main objective is to study the optimal
compensation strategy for TFQKD over asymmetric channels. Therefore, variable optical attenuators are used instead of real
fibers. Since the ability of Sagnac loop withstanding phase fluctuations is a function of its total length and the characteristic
frequencies of the fluctuations, when hundred of kilometers of real fibers are inserted into the loop to replace VOAs, the phase
stability and polarization stability of the current system would be affected. However, previous study in Ref.[14] have found that
FIG. 2: Schematic set-up of twin-field quantum key distribution (TFQKD) over optical channels with asymmetric losses. Charlie produces
un-modulated weak coherent pulses through his intensity modulator (IMC ) and variable optical attenuator (VOAC ) and distributes the pulses
to Alice and Bob. The pulses enter the Sagnac loop through a circulator and a 50:50 beam splitter (BS) where they splits into clockwise and
counter-clockwise traveling pulses. The clockwise traveling pulses first pass through the attenuator VOAA and and Alice’s station without
being modulated. Then they go through a 7-km fiber spool and arrive at Bob’s station. Based on the bases Bob chooses (signal basis or decoy
basis), he modulates the phases and intensities of the pulses by his phase modulator and intensity modulator. Then Bob forwards the modulated
pulses back to Charlie’s BS though the attenuator VOAB . The same process applies to the counter-clockwise traveling pluses, except that only
Alice would modulate the phases and intensities of the counter-clockwise traveling pulses. The modulated pulses from Alice and Bob interfere
with each other at Charlie’s BS and are detected by Charlie’s two single photon detectors D0 and D1.
4Overall Loss Intensity Key rate
sA µA νA sB µB νB Infinite data Finite data
25 + 15 dB
Asym. 0.0448 0.300 0.120 0.00529 0.300 0.120 1.017× 10−4 5.013× 10−5
Add loss 0.0213 0.481 0.146 0.0213 0.481 0.146 3.727× 10−5 1.688× 10−5
No comp. 0.0036 0.247 0.0923 0.0036 0.247 0.0923 7.163× 10−6 0
30 + 20 dB
Asym. 0.030 0.514 0.108 0.00373 0.514 0.108 1.666× 10−5 6.971× 10−6
Add loss 0.0147 0.444 0.133 0.0147 0.444 0.133 2.382× 10−6 2.677× 10−7
33 + 23 dB Asym. 0.0274 0.401 0.120 0.0035 0.401 0.120 2.918× 10−6 3.174× 10−7
TABLE I: List of intensity sets and experimental secret key rates for the overall system loss 40 dB, 50 dB and 56 dB. The loss between Alice
and Charlie is always 10 dB higher than the loss between Bob and Charlie. sA/B is Alice’s/Bob’s signal intensity. µA/B , νA/B are the decoy
intensities. ω is the vacuum state and is not listed here. The secret key rate is calculated based on the observed gains and quantum bit error
rates. The size of the total data sent to Charlie is 3 × 1010. Both infinite-data case and finite-data case are considered. For each loss, the first
row shows intensities and key rates with asymmetric signal intensities; the second row (if exists) gives the intensities and key rates with adding
extra losses; the third row (if exists) is the case where no compensation is applied.
FIG. 3: Secret key rate (per pulse) in logarithmic scale as a function of the overall loss between Alice and Bob for a) infinite-data case and b)
finite-data case. The secret key rate is calculated based on the observed gains and quantum bit error rates. The size of the total data sent to
Charlie is 3× 1010. The solid black line represents one representative of the repeaterless bound [4]. The blue solid curve is the simulated key
rate with asymmetric signal intensities; the red dash curve is the simulated key rate with adding extra losses; the purple dash-dotted curve is
the simulated key rate with no compensation. All the scattered points are the experimental secret key rates. The blue rhombi represent the case
with asymmetric signal intensities; the red circles represent the case where extra 10 dB attenuation is added on Bob’s side; the purple hexagon
is the key rate obtained when no compensation is applied. As observer, the strategy of applying asymmetric signal intensities always provides
better key rates than the other two strategies.
a Sagnac loop with 300 km loop length, corresponding to 60 dB of loss, is adequate in maintaining phase stability required for
TFQKD.
The experiment has been performed over three overall channel losses between Alice and Bob, 40 dB, 50 dB and 56 dB. The
channel losses between Alice and charlie is always 10 dB higher than the losses between Bob and Charlie, i.e., ηB = ηA × 10.
The detector efficiency (11.7%) is included in the overall loss. To test the asymmetric-intensity strategy, We allow Alice and
Bob to choose asymmetric signal intensities sA and sB , but keep their decoy intensities symmetric. We have also tested the
strategy where all the intensities are symmetric but another 10 dB attenuation is added on Bob’s side to compensate the channel
asymmetry. Additionally, at the overall loss of 40 dB, we have conducted the experiment where Alice and Bob use identical
sets of operations as they do for TFQKD with symmetric channels (no compensation at all). All the signal intensities sA/B and
decoy intensities µA/B , νA/B used in the experiment are close to the optimal values and are listed in table (I). (ω is the vacuum
state and therefore is not listed.) Note that when Alice and Bob test the asymmetric-intensity strategy, the intuitive way is to set
sA/sB = ηB/ηA = 10. However, as indicated in table (I), the ratio of the optimal sA to sB slightly deviates from 10. This is
because, as described in Ref.[22], although the interference visibility (which affects X basis QBER) favors sA/sB = ηB/ηA,
there are other factors affecting sA, sB - namely, a tight estimation of the phase error rate favors small values of both sA and sB
5(which determine the cat state coefficients) and makes optimal sA/sB deviate from exactly ηB/ηA.3 The size of the total data that
Alice and Bob send to Charlie in each run is 3×1010. Due to the limit of the available AWG channels, the signal state and decoy
state are not randomly switched in the experiment. But this random switch can be easily accomplished with more resources.
As a proof-of-principle demonstration, our current implementation is feasible to study the optimal compensation strategies for
TFQKD with asymmetric channel losses. The secret key rate is calculated based on the observed gains and quantum bit error
rates. Both infinite-data case and finite-data case are considered and the experimental results are depicted in Fig. (3), which
shows the secret key rate (per pulse) in logarithmic scale as a function of the overall loss between Alice and Bob. The blue
rhombi are the experimental key rates obtained with asymmetric signal intensities; the red circles are the key rates of the case
where extra 10 dB attenuation is added on Bob’s side; the purple hexagon is the key rate obtained when no compensation is
applied. The corresponding simulated secret key rates of the above three cases are also shown in Fig. (3), represented by blue
solid curve, red dash curve and purple dash-dotted curve respectively. Additionally, we use the solid black line in the figure to
show the repeaterless bound [4].
As shown in Fig. (3a) where the infinite-data case is considered, applying asymmetric signal intensities can always help
generate positive key rates for all tested losses. Moreover, at the total loss of 50 dB, the experimental key rate with asymmetric
signal intensities is as high as 1.67×10−5, even beating the repeaterless bound. However, the key rates of the other two strategies
are always lower than the bound. Even worse, no secret keys can be extracted at 56 dB total loss in the adding-loss scenario. If
no compensation is applied, there exists positive key rate only when the total loss is 40 dB. In the finite-data case, as shown in
Fig. (3b), again, the key rates with asymmetric signal intensities are always higher than the key rates with adding extra losses or
applying no compensation. At the total loss of 56 dB, the experimental key rate with asymmetric signal intensities is 3.17×10−7
while no keys can be generated with the other two strategies. At 50 dB, the experimental key rate with asymmetric intensities
is 6.97 × 10−6, about 30 times of the key rate in the adding-loss scenario. At 40 dB, the key rate with no compensation is still
positive but very small in simulation. However, due to fluctuations in experiment, we could not obtain any keys in the finite-data
scenario if no compensation is applied. Note that in Fig.(3a), the experiment key rates are always lower than the simulations
(except at 40 dB loss). This is due to the fact that the all the intensities are optimized based on finite-data scenario, while the
simulations take the intensities optimized for infinite-data scenario.
Overall, the experimental results are consistent with the simulations. As indicated in Fig.(3), the distance coverage of TFQKD
over optical channels with asymmetric losses is significantly diminished if no compensation is made. Deliberately adding extra
losses to compensate the asymmetry could help increase the key rate to some extent, but is not comparable to the strategy of
using asymmetric signal intensities. By allowing Alice and Bob to set asymmetric intensities, the secure key rate of TFQKD with
asymmetric channel losses can be dramatically increased. The higher the loss, the more key rate enhancement the asymmetric-
intensity strategy can achieve. Besides the advantage of providing higher key rate, the asymmetric-intensity strategy is also
more convenient and efficient to implement. Especially in a network setting, the adding-loss strategy requires that every user
should prepare different compensation losses inside his/her station for different connections. While for the asymmetric-intensity
strategy, the users only have to adjust their signal intensities for all different connections. Even when new users join the network,
no system modifications are required for the old users. Therefore, a straightforward application of our demonstration in this
work can be the study of Sagnac-loop based QKD network.
In summary, we have demonstrated the first proof-of-principle experiment of TFQKD over optical channels with asymmetric
losses. Sagnac interferometer is applied for the auto phase stabilization. Our experiment shows that, compensation strategies
are necessary for TFQKD with asymmetric channel losses. Two strategies have been tested, that are applying asymmetric
signal intensities or adding extra losses to make the channel loss symmetric again. Compared with the latter strategy, applying
asymmetric signal intensities provides much better secure key rate for TFQKD with asymmetric channel losses. It keeps the
major advantage of TFQKD, i.e., surpassing the repeaterless bound, and significantly enlarges the distance coverage. Our
implementation provides the first experimental study of TFQKD with asymmetric channel losses and shows the feasibility of
applying TFQKD to build the long-distance quantum network in reality.
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3 We would like to point out that it is more convenient to use the intensities that fulfill sA/sB = ηB/ηA, especially for the Sagnac-loop based system which
automatically provides such intensity compensation. Considering the experimental fluctuations, the tested key rate with the exact ratio sA/sB = 10 can be
even higher than the rate with optimal ratio.
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